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RECENT DECISIONS

important part, for the effect of a statement depends on the atmosphere and circumstances at the time it was uttered.28 However, since
the employer has such a great economic advantage over the employees, 29 it is difficult to see how that element of coercion can be
removed completely from the employer's statements3 0
R. B. G.

LABOR LAw-SIT-DowN STRIxE-RIGHT OF N. L. R. B. TO
ORDER REINSTATEMENT.-The union which represented a majority
of defendant's employees called a sit-down strike when defendant refused to bargain collectively. The latter thereupon discharged all those
employees actively participating in the strike. The employer had previously been guilty of other unfair labor practices. After they were
finally evicted and business operations were resumed, defendant reemployed many of the strikers. The union again asked for recognition, and again defendant refused. The N. L. R. B. ordered the employer to reinstate the other strikers,1 and to bargain collectively with
the union. 2 On appeal from a judgment refusing to enforce the orders,
held, affirmed. Sit-down strikes are illegal. Therefore, despite the
prior unfair labor practices, the employer has the right to discharge
employees who participate in such a strike, and the Board has no
power to order their reinstatement. N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 59 Sup. Ct. 490 (1939).
Sit-down strikes s are, a fairly recent development in labor relations. The earliest known case occurred in 1885, 4 but they did not
See supra notes 4 and 12.
49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. 151 (Supp. 1935).
See Note (1938) 48 YArx L. J. 54, 72, where the author gently rebukes
the court, saying, "The wisdom of the court in rejecting so completely the
positive findings of an expert administrative body, versed in the technique of
labor tactics, is open to question."
'Included in this order are fourteen men who did not "sit down" but who
aided and abetted the strikers by handing in food, clothing etc. As to these
the court refused to enforce the order in spite of the fact that they remained
"employees", and were not included in the general discharge. They were just
as guilty as the actual strikers themselves. See N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio
and Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904 (1938).
2 The court refused to enforce the order because, although before the strike
the union represented a majority of the workers, the altered circumstances furnished no basis for the conclusion that the union had a majority after the strike.
' Sit-down strikes are either "quickies" or "stay-ins". A "quickie" is
merely a ceasing of work temporarily, without a seizure of the plant, while a
"stay-in" is a seizure and a setting up of a community within the plant. Porter,
The Broad Clllenge of the Sit-Dozuo (April 4, 1937) N. Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, p. 8.

'A "quickie" occurred when striking workers temporarily stopped freight
traffic by occupying the yards and shops on a railroad owned by Jay Gould.
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gain prominence until 1933. 5 The basis of any attempt to justify a
sit-down strike is the theory that the workers have a property right
in their jobs, and in order to protect that right, they may occupy the6
employer's plant which is so essentially bound up with their jobs.
The courts have refused to accept this theory. 7 Although sit-down
strikes have been repeatedly declared illegal by state courts which
have granted injunctions against them, 8 this is the first time a sit-

down strike has been involved in a controversy before the United
States Supreme Court. 9
The Board, in this action, did not contend that the sit-down strike
was legal; it claimed that since the unfair labor practices of the employer caused the strike, the Board had power to order reinstatement.
But the Act giving the Board power to remedy unfair labor practices
does not authorize the reinstatement of strikers who participate in
illegal acts. 10 They do not make the employer an outlaw or deprive
him of his legal rights to the possession and protection of his property." To justify a sit-down strike because of the existence of a
labor dispute or of an unfair labor practice would have the effect of
putting a "premium on resort to force instead of legal remedies and to
subvert the principles of law and order which lie at the foundations of
society." 12 At common law the employer had an absolute right to
discharge for any or no reason an employee hired under a contract
fixing no definite period of employment. 13 Under the N. L. R. A.,
this right is qualified insofar as he may not wield it as a weapon to
intimidate and coerce the employees in respect to their self-organization and collective bargaining. 14 Ordinarily, where the employer has
Patch, Control of the Sit-Down Strike (March 26 1937) EDITORIAL RESEARCH
REPORTS, Vol. I, No. 12. However, real sit-down strikes, or "stay-ins" began

in 1906 when workers succeeded in shutting down the General Electric Light
Plant in Schenectady.
' Sit-down strike in the Firestone Rubber Plant in Akron, Ohio, in July,
1933.

See Note (1937)

23 VA. L.

REv.

799.

'Note (1937) 35 MicH. L. REv. 1330, 1335-1336.
'Note (1938) 23 IOWA L. Rav. 149.
'Equity grants an injunction because of the inadequacy of damages at law.
Fansteel M. Corp. v. Lodge 66, 14 N. E. (2d) 991 (Ill. App. 1938); General
Motors v. International Union U. A. W. A., Mich. C. C. (1937) 4 U. S. L.
Week 678; Chrysler Corp. v. International Union U. A. W. A., Mich. C. C.
(1937) 4 U. S. L. Week 858. But see Note (1938) 23 IoWA L. REv. 149,
which submits that the "clean hands" doctrine of equity should apply, and the
injunction should be refused if the employer has been guilty of an unfair labor

practice; likewise, the injunction should be refused where it is improbable that
it will be enforced.

"Instant case.
'49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1935).
"Ibid.
Instant case.
"39 C. J. § 1454; N. L. R. B. v. Thompson Products, Inc., 97 F. (2d) 13

(C. C. A. 6th, 1938).
"4Section 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 453, 29 U.
S. C. A. § 158(3) (Supp. 1935), N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.,
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been guilty of unfair labor practices, the Act, in effect, deprives him
of his right to discharge subsequently striking employees. 15 Where
the employees are guilty of criminal acts, the employer retains the
absolute right to discharge them for that reason. 16 Consequently,
since there was no excuse for the sit-down strike, the employer had
the right to exercise his common law power to discharge. 17
Section 2(3) of the Act '8 defines "employees" as including "any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute, or because of any unfair labor
practice * * *."

Section 10(c)19 grants the Board power to force

the employer "to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement
of employees * * *, as will effectuate the policies" of the Act. The
Board contended, therefore, that since the strikers remained employees
the Board had power to order their reinstatement; and further, even
if they lost their status as employees, under its general power to order
"affirmative action as will effectuate the policies" of the Act, the Board
could order their reemployment. Once the strikers were discharged,
they did not remain employees, because their work did not cease as
a consequence of an unfair labor practice, but merely as a result of
their own illegal actions.20 The authority to command an affirmative
action is "remedial, not punitive"; 21 it is broad but not unlimited.
"It has the essential limitations which inhere in the very policies of
the Act which the Board invokes." 22 The dominant purpose of the
National Labor Relations Act is to encourage peaceful settlements
of labor disputes. 23

The answering of the question as to whether the

policies of the Act would be effectuated is solely for the Board, subject
301 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615 (1937); N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, 94 F. (2d)
862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1935) ; Associated Press
v. N. L. R. B., 301 U. S. 103, 57 Sup. Ct. 650 (1937); N. L. R. B. v. RemingtonRand, 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
"See note 17, infra. Bui cf. N. L. R. B. v. Oregon Worsted Co., 96 F.
(2d) 193 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
" Standard Stone and Lime Co. v. N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 531 (C. C. A.
4th, 1938) (employer had right to discharge employees for destruction of property and assault on non-union workers during a strike; employer, however, had
been guilty of no previous unfair labor practices); Peninsular and Occidental
S. S. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) (discharge for
sit-down strike); Ballston-Stillwater K. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 758
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938) (union struck without cause; court refused to enforce
reinstatement).
149 STAT. 450, 29 U. S. C. A. § 152(3) (Supp. 1935).
"49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(c) (Supp. 1935).
See § 2(3), cited supra note 18. Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio and
Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904 (1938).
'Instant case; Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 59 Sup. Ct. 206
(1938), (1939) 13 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 387.
'Instant case. N. L. R. B. v. Remington Rand, 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A.
2d, 1938); Clover Fork Coal Co. v. N. L. R. B., 97 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 6th,
1938).
"49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1935).
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to the limitation, however, that it may not be arbitrary, unreasonable,
or capricious. 24 In this case its power has clearly been transcended.
R. B. G.
S. C. S.

LABOR UNIONS-COLLECTIVE
JUNCTION-SECTION 876-A C. P.

BARGAINING

AGREEMENT-IN-

A.-The plaintiff-employer and

defendant-union entered into a collective bargaining agreement for
one year, under the terms of which it was agreed that during its
existence "there should be no strike or lockout." The union called
a strike in alleged violation of the. agreement. The employer then
brought suit for an injunction, alleging a breach of the contract; he
also alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action under Section
876-a of the New York Civil Practice Act.1 The Appellate Division
dismissed the complaint, reversing the decision of the Special Term
which granted the injunction, on the ground that the contract was
unenforceable in equity as it was against the legislative policy of this
state. 2 On appeal, held, reversed, "The complaint contains all the
allegations required by Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act preInstant case. § 10 of the ACT, 49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160
(Supp. 1935).
1

N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §876-a: "Injunctions issued in labor disputes.
1. No court nor any judge * * * shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing
out of a labor dispute, as hereinafter defined, except after a hearing, and except
after findings of all the folldwing facts by the court * * * : (a) That unlawful
acts have, or a breach of any contract [collective bargaining] not contrary to
public policy, has been threatened or committed and that such acts or breach
will be executed or continued unless restrained; (b) That substantial and
irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow unless the relief
requested is granted; (c) * * * [that compainants will suffer more than the
defendant by denial of the injunctionj ; (d) That complainant has no adequate
remedy at law; (e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect
complainant's property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protection; * * *." (Italics ours.)
Aberdeen Restaurant Corp., 158 Misc. 785, 285 N. Y. Supp. 832 (1935)
(holding that "this section is constitutional since there is no deprivation of a
right, but only a limitation of circumstance under which an injunction will be
issued").
For a discussion of the court's construction of the term "labor dispute" as
used in this section see (1938) 12 ST. JOHN'S L. Rxv. 358.
For a general discussion of the Norris-La Guardia Act upon which § 876-a
is based, see (1938) 13 ST. JoHIN's L. Rav. 171; Tapley, The Anti-Union Contracts (1936) 11 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 40; for discussion of § 876-a see PRAsHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON NEW YORE PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1937) 1062-64.
Nevins, Inc. v. Kasmach, 252 App. Div. 890 (2d Dept. 1937).

